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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
on the running board. The court also rejected the doctrine of pari delicto,
predicating its holding on the premise that the adult hitchhikers brought
on their own misfortune by their own "illegal conduct in using the 'speaking
thumnb'."' 1 Penalizing the driver for his violation would result undesirably
in giving the original violators an advantage instead of a penalty.
The court seemed to say that the hitchhikers entrapped the kindly
motorist into an unwitting and careless act of generosity, 8 unhappily made
unlawful by the legislature, and that such entrapment suspended or rendered
nugatory the host's violation, thus transmuting his invitation into a lawful
act, The argument that the first lawbreaker cannot take advantage of the
second lawbreaker, whereas the second lawbreaker may assert the violation
of the first lawbreaker implies an estoppel, although the nature of the violation was criminal. Statutory violation has both criminal and civil aspects.
The ultimate issue here is one of civil liability.
Should the plaintiff's or the defendant's violation of a minor statute
affect the outcome? Not all legislation is enforceable under any and all
conditions. If two statutes conflict, the undoubted desire of the legislature
to effectuate substantial justice should suffice to over-ride the lesser traffic
statute in favor of the substantive type law-expressed in the guest statute.

TORTS

-

OVERHANGING BRANCHES
OF SELF HELP

-

REMEDY

Plaintiff brought a suit for damages for injury to his realty from overhanging branches of trees rooted in the adjoining land, and for abatement
of this nuisaucc. Held, plaintiff is not entitled to damages or an order of
abatement. The sole remedy of self-help is adequate, though limited only
to the overhanging limbs. Sterling v. Weinstein, 75 A.2d 144 (D.C. Munic.
Ct. 1950).
The overwhehning weight of authority is to the effect that self-help
is the sole remedy for overhanging branches, or invading roots, when they
are not noxious.' However, self-help does not include a license to trespass
against the adjoining owner. 2 Most courts will allow recovery for injury
from noxious growths, but use the injury rather than the growth, as thc
17. Compare Bateman v. Ursich, 200 P.2d 314 (Wash. 1950) with Dashiell v.
Moore, 117 Md. 657, 11 A.2d 640 (1940).
18. Dobbs v. Sugioka, 117 Colo. 218, 219, 185 P.2d 784, 785 (1947), "This
section (§ 371, the guest statute) was enacted to prevent recovery by those having no
nsoral right to recompense, those carried for their own convenience, for their own business

or pleasure, those invited by the operator as a mere generous gesture, 'hitch-hikers' and
'bums' who sought to make a profit out of soft-hearted and unfortunate motorists."

1. Michalson v. Nutting, 275 Mass. 232, 175 N.E. 490 (1931); Cranberry v. Jones,
188 Tenn. 51, 216 S.W.2d 721 (1941); Cobb v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 90 Vt.
342, 98 At]. 758 (1916); accord, Iickey v. Michigan C.R.R., 96 Mich. 498, 55 N.V.
989 (1893) (use self-help after notice to owner of tree); see I'arndqn v. Stultz, 124 Iowa
440, 441, 10 N.W. 329, 330 (1904) (involving a line hedge); Wegener v. Sugarman,
104 N.J.L. 26, 27, 138 At], 699, 700 (1927) (where defendant's contractor completely
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criterion.' The injured party has no right to damages where the self-help
doctrine is enforced because under it he does not have a cause of action
except for those jurisdictions which have made a slight inroad upon the
self-help rule by allowing recovery for "real and sensible injury," 4 without,
however, exactly defining the term.
The Restatement of Torts5 has been followed by a few cases0 which
hold the defendant liable for growths resulting from human activity of the
defendant or his predecessors., and which withhold liability for natural
growths. The principal case has adequately denounced the prediction of
liability based on the theory of the Restatement, 7 because of the probable
impossibility of determining whether growth is natural or the result of
human conduct. Planting several generations ago would bind a present
grantee, by the rule which permits an ancient, "accidental" act, to determine
the present tort liability of adjoining landowners. One can readily see how
ludicrous this rule is in the case of the bona fide purchaser whose newly acquired land has a tree with hidden, but protruding roots.
We are now left with a fundamental, irreconcilable conflict between
two ideas. The first, which states that the law exists for the peaceable settlement of disputes, conflicts with those courts, as the one in the instant
case, which urge upon petitioners for redress of their grievances the dangerous remedy of self-help, considered adequate as late as July, 1950.8 Self-help
is dangerous and consequentlyi never adequate because it contains the seeds
of tort and crime such as assault, battery and even murder.
The Florida Constitution, in the Declaration of Rights, Section 4, provides that every person shall have a remedy for "any injury done him in his
lands," goods, person or reputation." The maxim, "for every wrong a remedy," was given vigor by this section and vitality by the courts.' Whenever
destroyed a hedge); Skinner v. Wilder, 38 Vt. 115, 116 (1865) (conversion of the fruit
on the overhanging branches); Mills v. Brooker, 1 K.B. 555, 557 (1919) (ownership of
overhanging fruit). Contra: Ackerman v. Ellis, 81 N.J.L. 1, 79 Atl. 883 (1911); see
Luke v. Scott, 98 Ind. App. 15, 187 N.E. 63, 64 (1933); Toledo, St. L. & K.C.R.R. v.
Loop, 139 Ind. 542, 544, 545, 39 N.E. 306, 307 (1894) (Indiana allows either self-help
after notice or an action for damages); sec Cranberry v. Jones, sutpra, (for overhanging
branches) and NMichalson v. Nutting, supra, (for protruding roots).

2. Newberry v. Bunda, 137 Mich. 69, 100 N.W. 277 (1904); Luke v. Scott, supra
note 1;Wegener v. Sugarman, suPra note 1, (self-help excludes trespass).
3. Buckingham v.Elliot, 62 Miss. 296 (1884) (mulberry roots injured a well, there.
fore noxious); Crowhurst v. Burial Bd. of Amersham, L.R. 4 Ex. D. 5 (1878) (yew trees
poisoned cattle therefore noxious); Smith v. Giddy, 2 K.B. 448 (1904) (where the court
said noxiousness was immaterial and applied the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L.
330 [1858J).
4. Tanner v. Wallbrun, 77 Mo. App. 262 (1898); Countrynan v. Lighthill, 24 Hun
405 (N.Y. 1881); Lemmon v. Webb, 3 Gh. 1 (1894); see Gulf C. &S.F. Ry v. Oakes, 94
Tex. 155, 58 S.W. 999(1900) (for an interesting variation, predicating liability and plaiutiff's right of action on proof of defendant's negligence).
5. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 839, 840 (1939).
6. Griefield v,Gibraltar Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 199 Miss. 175, 24 So.2d 356 (1946).
7. See Sterling v. Weinstein, 75 A.2d 144, 146 (D.C. Munic. Ct. 1950).
8. Date of the principal case.
9. Emphasis supplied by the writer.
10. See Williams v. Mayes, 155 Fla. 129, 133, 19 So.2d 709, 711 (1944) (concerned
the liability of a sheriff for negligently shpoting his deputy); Lawson v. Woodruff, 134 Fla.
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one party alleges a wrong done to him by another, the courts should adjudicate the complaint, rather than deny or defeat the plaintiff's prayer for
11
relief on some such grounds as self-help.

It would appear that legislation is in order to correct this defect in the
common law which permits of self-help. States like California, Oklahoma,
and \Vashington have met the problem squarely and solved it safely by including overhanging branches and protruding roots in the judicial interpretation of their nuisance statutes which confcr upon the aggrieved party
a right of action. Under these modern prov'isions, 2- plaintiffs have a remedy
in damages,13 as well as the injunctive relief, "4 which was nonexistent at
law, in trespass or ejectment, whether the courts were disposed to grant
relief or not.

The argument, that thus conferring a right of action would clog the
courts with numerous, vexatious suits is ill-founded' when recovery can be
limited to nominal damages' and in any event is preferable to the dangers
of self-help which confront the community.
The law of trespass, where the injury determines the amount of damages

and not the right of legal action, should logically be applied to branches or
roots which are trespassing, though in the air or under the ground. New
7
Jersey followed this rule in the absence of legislation in Ackerman v. Ellis,
where the court said the degree of the injury goes to the extent of recovery
and not to the right of action. Legislation requiring other courts to follow
New Jersey and the code states already mentioned is essential to achieve
uniformity under the more civilizcd rule of resorting to the courts for settlemenit of disputes.
437, 445-446, 184 So. 81, 83 (1938) ("...
it is expressly made the duty of all courts
of this state to administer 'right and justice' 'by due course of law' to 'every person for any
injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation.' ") (Emphasis supplied by the
writer).
11. See MeDuffic v. McDuffie, 155 Fla. 63, 67, 19 So.2d 511, 513 (1944) (a divorce
case).
12. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3479 (1949); CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. ANN. § 731 (1949);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 50, §§ 1, 6, 12, 13 (1941); REIuNCTON'S WAsU. REv. STA'r. (1915),

§§ 943, 945.
13. CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. ANN. § 731 (1949), Crance v. Items, 17 CaI.App.2d 450,
62 P.2d 395 (1936), Shevlin v. Johnson, 56 Cal. App. 563, 205 Pac. 1087 (1922),
Stevens v. Moon, 54 Cal. App. 737, 202 Pac. 961 (1889); OKLA. STAT. tit. 50 § 6 (1941),
Mead v. Vincent, 199 Okla. 508, 187 P.2d 994 (1947); RinmiNcroN's WAsH. REv. STAl1.
(1915), § 943, Forbus v. Knight, 24 Wash.2d 397, 163 P.2d 822 (1946), Gostina v.
Ryland, 116 Wash. 228, 199 Pac. 822 (1921).
14. OrL. STAT. tit. 50, § 13 (1941); cases cited note 11 supra.
15. Gostina v. Ryland, supra note 13 (where vexatiousness of plaintiff's cause under
a nuisance statute was no defense).
16. As in numerous trespass actions, or as ill Grandona v. Lovdal, 78 Cal. 611, 21
Pac. 366 (1899) (where the code conferred a right of action which the court did not
deny, although in its adjudication of the dispute it found no nuisance, recognized self-help
and held for the defendant because of a lack of any injurious effect upon the plaintiff).
17. 81 N.I.L. 1, 79 AtL. 883 (1911).

